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PREFACE 
 
he EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) is due to begin operation in January 2005. It 
will be a key instrument in addressing the EU’s goals on climate change. But there 
remain a number of open questions. These include pending EU legislation and guidelines 
as well as consistency of implementation across member states. Finally, the EU ETS raises 
questions on the emerging international climate change regime.  
This CEPS Task Force should be seen in conjunction with the earlier one which published its 
report on the EU ETS in October 2002. It met five times from January 2003 to January 2004. 
Members came from a broad range of backgrounds, including industry, business associations, 
environmental organisations and other stakeholders. Using presentations and data from Task 
Force members and invited speakers, the group addressed a range of outstanding issues which 
are helpful in advancing the collective understanding. But, for the purposes of this report, the 
group decided to focus on the linking directive. This emerged as a key issue and one on which 
legislation is imminent. 
The principal conclusions and recommendations are contained in the Executive Summary. The 
full analysis follows in the main body of the text.  
We welcome the opportunity to contribute to the resolution of these issues. There is widespread 
recognition of the merits of emissions trading. The EU has the opportunity to demonstrate 
constructive and pragmatic leadership and a willingness to provide an adaptive and inclusive 
response in pursuit of the common goal. 
I want to thank the members of the Working Party for their active and positive contributions, 
which proved to be one of the key values of this exercise. Although all members endorse the 
general content of the report, this should not be construed to mean that each member subscribes 
to every sentence of the text.  
 
 
Charles Nicholson 
Chairman of the CEPS Task Force 
 Group Senior Advisor, BP 
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COMPLETION OF THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
IN THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME 
REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
his CEPS report examines recent policies related to the completion of the EU emissions 
trading scheme (EU ETS), with a particular focus on the pending decision to link joint 
implementation (JI) and the clean development mechanism (CDM) to the EU ETS – the 
so-called ‘linking directive’. The analysis covers all the controversial issues associated with the 
linking directive, including the international implications as well as the business impact. The 
principal themes of the analysis include: timing, economic effects, project development and 
kick-starting the project mechanisms, ratification and entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, 
project quality (including qualitative restrictions), supplementarity (including quantitative 
restrictions), linking with other national emissions trading regimes and international 
implications. The report is divided into three parts. First, it sketches the arguments for and 
against linkage. Second, it identifies a set of conditions to be applied to achieve a stable balance 
between conflicting interests. Finally, it identifies priorities for action. 
I. Key messages  
1.  By linking non-EU credits to the EU ETS via the linking directive, the EU is taking a 
significant step towards establishing an international emissions trading market, which could 
become an important building block in the global climate regime. In order to be effective, 
the directive must strike the right balance between environmental and economic objectives, 
i.e. ensuring measurable and permanent reductions first in the EU and ‘supplemental’, while 
striving for cost-effectiveness and accommodating potential competitiveness effects on 
European industry. 
2.  It should be reiterated that both the linking directive and the EU ETS are a ‘domestic policy 
and measure’ in the Kyoto Protocol context. They do not affect either EU member states’ or 
other Parties’ rights and obligations under the Marrakech Accords. Nevertheless, there is an 
important link to the developing global climate regime in that agreement with the EU’s 
main partners within the Kyoto Protocol framework will be crucial for further international 
developments. The EU, which after enlargement will represent 25 out of the 38 Kyoto 
Protocol Annex B countries, bears major responsibility for achieving progress in the 
international negotiations with its partners.  
3.  The EU chose emissions trading as a policy instrument inter alia because of its expected 
advantages in terms of environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. The linking 
directive is a logical consequence, because it aims at further reducing compliance costs. At 
the same time, however, the directive strives both to meet the EU’s commitment to 
supplementarity, and to prevent the substitution of proper EU abatement efforts with 
reductions from questionable sources.  
4.  The proposed linking directive attempts to achieve a balance between environmental and 
economic objectives. Environmental objectives include supplementarity, measurable and 
permanent reductions, co-benefits, incentives to businesses undertaking projects, effects on 
technology transfer and the contribution to sustainable development and ultimately the 
extent to which incentives for developing countries to accept progressively firmer 
commitments are created. Economic objectives include the contribution to innovation and 
market opportunities for EU companies but also to reducing compliance costs, minimising 
the effects on the competitiveness of EU industry and the contribution. One way of 
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addressing this balance is the introduction of qualitative and quantitative restrictions. 
Qualitative restrictions aim at ensuring real reductions through sound projects, while 
quantitative restrictions seek to address the supplementarity objective.  
5.  It is reasonable to assume that at least until 2012 the overall effect of linking on EU 
allowance prices will be limited by a shortage of projects. Consequently, the linking 
directive has only a modest potential to address concerns of competitiveness both through 
direct and indirect effects of the EU ETS. In the longer term, however, when more projects 
are available, it will become more important to ensure that flows of credits from good 
projects are not hampered. Conversely, measures to ensure continuing domestic action 
through the ETS will also gain in importance. 
6.  Qualitative restrictions relate to considerations regarding project type and reflect both 
concerns about potential problems of environmentally and socially damaging projects, as 
well as the desire to promote technologies seen as more beneficial in terms of sustainable 
development and technology transfer.  
7.  As a result, the EU is considering restrictions on nuclear facilities, sinks and large hydro 
projects. Restrictions are based on the Marrakech Accord (i.e. nuclear), perceived problems 
with permanence (i.e. sinks) and the fear of environmental and social damage (i.e. large 
hydro projects). Technically, this would not seem to restrict project development in these 
sectors, since buyers will still exist outside the ETS and volumes are expected to be low. At 
the same time, there will most likely be no global environmental effect. However, the 
perception of risk and the smaller long-term market for project types excluded from the ETS 
would be likely to discourage development of such projects and lower the price of credits 
generated from them. They may also influence the position of the EU’s main Kyoto 
Protocol partners, which might not want to be seen as accepting credits from projects 
yielding lower environmental effects.  
8.  Quantitative restrictions: During the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech 
Accords, the EU was a firm proponent of the obligation to use JI and CDM in a 
supplemental way. As a result, the EU is considering a hard ceiling or a reference cap on 
these projects, i.e. upon reaching an EU ceiling, a review procedure would be triggered. 
Such a ceiling could be regarded as a safeguard against unexpected, and at present unlikely, 
floods of cheap credits into the EU, notably from projects abating non-CO2 gases. On the 
other hand, a hard ceiling may create rigidity in an emerging (carbon) market. A reference 
cap will reduce this risk, but it creates uncertainty in the market. Finally, due to the fact that 
marginal avoidance costs in countries that are likely to host CDM and JI projects are lower 
than in the EU, exclusion of or restrictions on the project mechanisms could lead to 
somewhat higher allowance prices. 
9.  Quantitative restrictions can be applied at EU, member state or entity level. If done at EU or 
member state level, companies will have a strong incentive to over-invest in outside credits 
early in order to avoid the cut-off. The fungibility of credits in the ETS means that in terms 
of total credit volume, an entity-level cap is equivalent to one set at EU level. This avoids 
these distortionary effects, although it may slightly increase transaction costs for companies 
and add rigidity.  
10. Linking to other national emissions trading schemes is more complex, thereby increasing 
transaction costs. Since no such schemes currently exist, however, this is hard to predict 
with any certainty.  
11. EU domestic offset projects, which capture reductions outside the covered trading sector, 
can bring both environmental and economic effects, but they raise many technical problems, 
e.g., double-counting. They are also likely to increase the complexity of the EU ETS. COMPLETION OF THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME | v 
 
II. Recommendations 
A. The EU context  
1.  The linking directive must help kick-start the Kyoto Protocol project mechanisms, which 
would be beneficial for both sustainable development and the Kyoto Protocol regime. One 
approach would be to allow CDM credits to be used for compliance with targets under the 
first period of the EU ETS from 2005. That would also address the issue of uncertainty 
stemming from the slow progress in international developments.  
2.  There is a need to bring short- and long-term objectives into line. Measures that might be 
necessary to achieve short-term objectives (e.g. avoiding and initial flood of cheap credits) 
must not be allowed to stand in the way of harnessing the forces of global carbon markets.  
3.  Any Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) redeemed during the 2005-07 period must be 
cancelled in order to avoid their use in member state registries during the Kyoto 
commitment period, which would effectively constitute ‘double-counting’, e.g. for the use 
of companies during 2005-07 and by member states thereafter. 
4.  The EU should not make the linking directive conditional on the issue of ratification and the 
coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol.  
a)  Linking JI/CDM to the EU ETS provides a form of insurance that the EU will go 
ahead with the Kyoto Protocol in any case.  
b)  The EU could convey the message that non-ratification likely means missing out on 
investment to other parties that have ratified. 
B. The international context 
1.  The EU, which after enlargement will represent 25 out of the 38 Kyoto Protocol Annex B 
countries, will need to be aware of its growing responsibility for achieving progress in the 
international negotiations with its partners.  
2.  As the frontrunner in the negotiations, the EU should act in a way designed to foster the 
progressive completion of a comprehensive global climate regime. This includes achieving 
real reductions, demonstrating that environmental objectives can be achieved by cost-
effective measures and engaging in effective cooperation with countries both inside and 
outside the Kyoto Protocol.  
3.  The EU should consider the effects of potential complications of restrictions on project 
eligibility going beyond the Marrakech Accords on the possibility to link with other national 
emissions trading schemes.  
4.  Although the EU has the prerogative to set its own rules as long as they do not violate 
international agreements such as the Marrakech Accords, it should ensure effective 
consultation with its international partners, to position itself for future negotiations. 
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COMPLETION OF THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
IN THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME 
REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE 
CHARLES NICHOLSON, CHAIRMAN 
CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER & NORIKO FUJIWARA, RAPPORTEURS 
1.   Introduction  
With the adoption of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) in October 2003,
1 the EU has 
laid the foundation for its strategy to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, particularly from 
energy and industry sectors, and to meet the Kyoto Protocol targets. Member states – old and 
new – assisted by the European Commission are busy implementing the EU ETS. At the same 
time, the European Commission has tabled additional proposals to complete the existing 
framework. The most important initiative is the proposed amendment to link Joint 
Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) to the EU emissions 
trading framework, the so-called ‘linking directive’. Other initiatives include the revision of the 
EC monitoring mechanism of Community CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions, a proposed 
regulation on fluorinated greenhouse gases and a proposal for a registry regulation. 
The sectors not covered by the EU ETS are supposed to be subject to other policies that have 
been adopted or are currently being discussed to ensure a comparable effort. Legislative 
initiatives include, for example, directives to promote renewable energy and to introduce energy 
taxation, a voluntary commitment by the car industry to reduce specific CO2 emissions of new 
car fleets by 25%, a directive on energy efficiency in buildings, the promotion of combined heat 
and power (CHP) and most recently, a proposal for rules to ensure that member states increase 
their energy efficiency by 1% annually. In addition, there are numerous actions in a number of 
areas such as the energy star programme for office equipment, the green light programme (to 
increase energy efficiency in lighting) or the clean urban transport initiative, which in one way 
or the other are closely linked to EU climate change policy. 
Despite the focus on domestic action, EU climate change policy with the EU ETS as its 
cornerstone cannot be regarded in isolation of international developments. Although the EU has 
pledged to implement its Kyoto Protocol commitments unilaterally – in case the Kyoto Protocol 
does not enter into force – it is strongly affected by international uncertainty. Russia, whose 
ratification is indispensable to bring the Kyoto Protocol into force, has neither ratified nor given 
a firm date for when it may do so. But even if and when Russia ratifies, there are still questions 
on the long-term future of the Kyoto Protocol. In the longer term, observance of the Kyoto 
Protocol or any other international climate change agreement without the re-engagement of the 
US and full engagement of developing countries will be economically harmful to certain sectors 
in the EU and other countries that have implemented reduction commitments but not achieved 
the environmental benefits that had been envisaged, by leaving the biggest emitters out. Thus, 
contrary to the original assumption (i.e. after the signature of the Kyoto Protocol or prior to 
COP 6 at The Hague), major uncertainty regarding international developments will most likely 
remain. 
                                                 
1 Directive 2003/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, 25 October 2003. 2 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA 
 
This CEPS report focuses on the issues associated with the linking directive. It analyses the 
different open issues both as to their potential effects within the EU and their possible 
international implications.  
Following this introduction, section 2 briefly sketches international developments and the 
implications for EU climate change policy. The third section concentrates on the linking 
directive and analyses the potential environmental and economic effects of the current proposal 
with a particular focus on the external implications.  
The report is preceded by an Executive Summary including Key Messages and 
Recommendations, which present the main findings of the report.  
2.  The EU ETS and the Future International Climate Regime 
With the adoption of the EU ETS, the EU has lived up to its pledges to assume a global 
leadership role in climate change and to implement policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
– unilaterally if needed. It is clear however that unilateral climate change policy is not an option 
for the long term, for both environmental and economic reasons. Hence, domestic EU climate 
change policy will need to be judged on the basis of inter alia the extent to which it addresses 
EU competitiveness issues and how it contributes to the development of the international 
climate change regime. 
More than 120 countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The parties to the Protocol are the EU 
and most other European countries, notably including the new member states, Japan, Canada 
and many developing countries. The Protocol’s entry into force, however, depends on Russian 
ratification, which remains uncertain. Another uncertainty is the future US position. The current 
administration of President Bush is firm in its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. At the same time, 
however, the administration has accepted that climate change represents a significant potential 
threat to the world and that “the changes are mostly due to human activities”.
2 There have also 
been a number of recent initiatives in the US Congress, notably the McCain-Lieberman bill, and 
local, state and regional initiatives, all of which make it very difficult to predict how the US 
situation may evolve.  
Finally, possibly the most difficult question is the future commitments of the developing 
countries. There is a solid body of research
3 in the area, but politically the issue is on ice. All 
questions of course relate to the future of the Kyoto Protocol and whether it will enter into force. 
And even assuming that the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, there might be difficult 
discussions with existing signatories, such as Japan and Canada. Negotiations for the second 
commitment period will be a new round based on consensus.  
                                                 
2 Both the 2002 Climate Change Action report by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the 
UNFCCC secretariat and a report by the National Research Council (2001) acknowledge that climate 
change is a potential threat and that human activity is the principal culprit. The former report quotes from 
page 5 of the report by the National Research Council: “Greenhouse gases are accumulating in earth's 
atmosphere as a result of human activities causing global mean temperature … to rise. … the changes we 
observed are likely due mostly to human activities. … the best scientific information indicates that if 
GHG concentrations continue to increase, changes are likely to occur.” The White House (2001) has 
acknowledged the precautionary principle in the context of the clear skies initiative: “We must address 
the issue of global climate change … while these uncertainties remain, we can begin now to address the 
human factors that contribute to climate change. Wise action now is an insurance policy against future 
risks”. In that same statement, President George W. Bush also acknowledged that the US is the world's 
largest emitter of GHG from human activity and assumed “the responsibility to reduce our emissions”.  
3 For a comprehensive analysis, see IEA (2002). COMPLETION OF THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME | 3 
 
In the present situation the EU has assumed a position of leadership in reducing emissions. It is 
now up to the EU to demonstrate that it is serious about the environmental outcome 
(environmental effectiveness) and is not merely paying lip service. In addition, the EU should 
attempt to show that climate policies can be implemented in a cost-effective way (economic 
efficiency) with minimal effect on competitiveness. And finally, the EU has a responsibility 
towards the future creation of the international climate regime whether it takes the form of the 
Kyoto Protocol or any other treaty. The success of an EU emissions trading regime will also be 
judged by the extent to which it can foster the relationship with non-EU countries, notably other 
actual or would-be ‘Kyoto-land’ members such as Japan, Canada and Russia, as well as entice 
the US to become engaged in climate change activities. This necessitates strict consistency on 
the part of the EU in developing its approach to the international process. It also touches upon 
the emerging global carbon markets. Linking of national ET schemes as envisaged by Article 25 
of the ETS directive may be one way to advance the international regime. Another issue is the 
role the EU can play in supporting the development of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms 
against a background of uncertainty. 
3.  The Linking Directive 
From the outset, the European Commission has held that linking JI and CDM to the EU ETS, 
which is referred to as the ‘linking directive’, would be addressed, although in separate 
legislation. The linking directive has been expected to boost the JI/CDM mechanisms by 
creating a direct link to the EU ETS, giving private investors an incentive to engage in JI and 
CDM and promoting technology transfer and investments in JI and CDM host countries in order 
to support their sustainable development. Without this link, there would be less private 
investment in JI/CDM. On 23 July 2003, the European Commission (2003a) formally published 
its proposal for amending the EU emissions trading directive and linking. The proposal raises a 
number of issues, which we have grouped into two categories: timing and substance. 
Timing relates to the question of whether CDM credits should be allowed already in 2005 or 
only in 2008. Under the rules of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords, JI credits will 
only be available as of 2008. Arguments in favour of 2005 have been based on grounds that the 
earlier date would reduce costs and boost CDM in the light of the uncertainty surrounding the 
international regime. Arguments for a later date (i.e. 2008) relate mainly to the uncertainty 
stemming from an incomplete set of international rules and their effects on the functioning of 
the market. Some have argued that the use of JI should be reserved as an incentive for 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, there is a host of practical aspects to consider. 
The first priority of the EU and its member states has been to ensure proper implementation of 
the EU ET directive and to ensure sufficient progress in the remaining legislation on, for 
example the monitoring mechanism, the registry or industrial gases. There were also queries on 
whether there would be sufficient credits available in 2005 to make linking relevant in practice.  
Questions on substance broadly relate to two issues: supplementarity (i.e. how much of the 
abatement should be done domestically and how much in non-EU countries) and project type 
and quality (e.g. should certain project types be banned or other quality criteria applied).  
The first relates to the relationship between economic efficiency (i.e. ‘delivering an efficient 
market’) and environmental effectiveness (i.e. ‘achieving environmental objectives’).
4 The EU 
ETS is first and foremost a ‘domestic policy and measure’ in the Kyoto Protocol framework. As 
a result, there have been concerns about opening up the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to 
non-EU credits and thereby farming out reductions. There are also worries that credits from the 
                                                 
4 This topic has been analysed in greater detail in chapter 3 of the previous CEPS Task Force Report on 
greenhouse gas emissions trading (see Egenhofer & Legge, 2002). 4 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA 
 
linking directive might be accumulated by member states when participating in international 
emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, due to the fact that marginal 
avoidance costs in countries that are expected to host CDM and JI projects are most likely to be 
lower than in the EU, exclusion of the project mechanism could lead to somewhat higher 
allowances prices. The extended impact assessment on the linking directive, for example, states 
that unlimited use of JI and CDM credits could halve the expected allowance price to €13 per 
tonne of CO2, thereby saving the enlarged EU €700 million.
5  
The concerns regarding project type reflect both potential problems with environmentally and 
socially damaging projects, as well as the desire to promote technologies seen as more 
beneficial in terms of sustainable development and technology transfer. In particular, the EU has 
argued repeatedly in international negotiations that sinks provide neither technology transfer nor 
reliable climate benefits, and that large hydroelectric dams, unless they meet the criteria of the 
World Commission on Dams, often entail unacceptable social and environmental impacts. 
Therefore, it seems a logical extension of EU policy to aim at excluding such project types from 
the ETS. 
Although Europe's main Kyoto Protocol partners have expressed concern over what they 
sometimes call ‘an EU tendency to renegotiate the Kyoto Protocol’, these concerns in fact do 
not actually entail any change in the EU position relative to the Marrakech Accords.  
3.1  The proposed JI/CDM linking directive 
The core element of the linking directive is to recognise JI and CDM credits as being equivalent 
to EU emissions allowances for their use within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). To 
this end, JI and CDM credits, respectively Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs) and Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs), will be converted
6 into EU allowances (EUAs).  
The main features of the proposed directive are the following: 
•  Qualitative restrictions. The proposed amending Directive excludes sinks and nuclear 
facilities from the list of project activities (Art. 11bis, paragraph 3).  
•  Quantitative restrictions. The proposed directive has opted for a reference cap instead 
of a fixed cap. According to Art. 11bis, paragraph 2, the European Commission will 
review whether there is a need to act when the number of CERs and ERUs reaches 6% 
of the total quantity of allowances.  
•  Timing. The amending directive currently foresees that JI and CDM credits as outlined 
in the proposal could be used no earlier than 2008.  
•  Eligibility. Exclusion of JI projects in the covered sector in new member states (Art. 
11ter, second paragraph) with a few exceptions.
7  
•  Various other provisions. These foresee a number of technical requirements that are 
related either to the Marrakech Accords or EU legislation. They include special 
                                                 
5 See European Commission (2003b). The analysis takes into account transaction costs and potential 
availability of credit. See also Table 1. 
6 That conversion is done by member states is a logical extension of the fact that allowances are issued 
through the national allocation plans. 
7 To avoid double-counting of emissions reductions in the new EU member states, credits from JI projects 
will not be granted if they are achieved in the sectors covered by the EU ETS. This does not apply for the 
first commitment period if projects are approved before the end of 2004 or before the new member states 
enter the EU.  COMPLETION OF THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME | 5 
 
requirements for baseline setting for projects in new member states, requirements on the 
environmental and social impacts of projects as laid down in the Marrakech Accords 
and compliance with the regulation on public access to information (Directive 
2003/4/EC) and the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for policies, plans and 
programmes of Directive 2001/42/EC. Finally, verification is linked to the accreditation 
by the CDM Executive Board. In parallel to the Kyoto Protocol JI fast track provisions, 
member states can designate verification bodies that operate within the EU Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), a voluntary initiative designed to improve 
companies’ environmental performance (see Art. 4 of Regulation 761/2001/EC). 
The central issue around which discussions have revolved is how to tackle the potential tension 
between environmental and economic objectives. In economic terms, the unhindered use of JI 
and CDM in the EU ETS is seen to potentially add value in several different ways. Credits can 
increase flexibility and liquidity in the ETS, thereby increasing its efficiency. At the same time, 
credits can act as a safety valve (i.e. a safeguard against excessively high allowance prices), 
thereby reducing potentially negative effects on competitiveness. In turn, all this together can 
increase the acceptance accorded the scheme by industry. Credits can also be a means to spur 
new investment in non-EU countries and can thus potentially increase international support for a 
global climate change regime. On the other hand, there are a number of drawbacks of 
‘outsourcing’. The EU might not live up to its responsibility to reduce emissions domestically 
(‘supplementarity’). In addition to international legal obligations, there are a number of 
economic and environmental arguments to be taken into account. Full flexibility risks the 
possibility that the EU would forfeit environmental co-benefits.
8 It might also retard 
technological development (‘dynamic efficiency argument’), which would give the EU a first-
mover advantage. Furthermore, uncertainties regarding the international market price for credits 
will undermine the usefulness of the ETS as a tool for pricing carbon in investment decisions for 
EU companies. Limiting the use of outside credits may help ‘hedge’ some of this uncertainty. 
3.2  Analysis of the proposed linking directive  
The proposed directive is currently under discussion in both the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament under the co-decision procedure, whereby both the Council and the 
Parliament need to reach agreement in either one or two readings.
9 The following issues will be 
critical in determining the final shape of the directive.  
3.2.1 Timing 
Most stakeholders agreed that the initial 2005-07 starting phase of the EU ETS should be kept 
simple to allow member states to become acquainted with a new instrument. This point was 
reinforced by the fact that the operation of the EU ETS will depend crucially on the National 
Allocation Plans (NAPs), which are not due to be adopted before mid-2004. In addition, it was 
generally assumed that the carbon constraint for industry in the initial phase based on the 
national allocation would be limited, given that the absolute national limits stemming from the 
burden-sharing agreement originating from the Kyoto Protocol would not yet apply. Finally, the 
                                                 
8 Some mitigation actions might yield extensive benefits in areas outside climate change, which are called 
co-benefits or ancillary benefits. Typical examples of the benefits of climate change measures include 
lower local pollution caused by NOx or SO2 and reduced congestion and noise from transport. They may 
also generate double-dividend effects (e.g. lower labour taxes and job creation) or induce technological 
change. According to the OECD (2002), ancillary benefits have been estimated at anywhere between 30% 
to over 100% of abatement costs. 
9 At this moment, there is a good chance that the Council and the European Parliament will agree on a 
single reading, thereby speeding up the decision-making process.  6 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA 
 
significance of credits was seen as low, especially since JI credits will only be available as of 
2008.  
Competitiveness impacts 
While it is still true that the carbon constraint for EU industry is likely to remain ‘limited’ – as 
evidence from national allocation seems to suggest – even a modest carbon constraint may 
cause competitiveness problems at least in certain specific product markets. This is because of a 
combination of effects: indirect economic effects as a result of rising power prices
10 and the fact 
that industry operating in countries without any or a lesser carbon constraint does not face a 
similar disadvantage. Theoretically, the availability of CDM credits could mitigate such effects, 
at least to a degree, but this will depend on the number of projects available, which is difficult to 
project. Thus, the theoretical possibility of CDM significantly reducing compliance costs may 
not actually materialise because of a lack of projects.  
Project development 
Nevertheless, allowing CDM credits for compliance as of 2005 is most likely to have a positive 
effect on the development of projects, which has always been an objective of the EU. An 
important point is that any CERs redeemed during the 2005-07 period must be cancelled, to 
avoid their subsequent use in member state registries during the Kyoto commitment period , 
which would be an effective ‘double-counting’, that is for the use of CERs by companies during 
2005-07 and then by the member states thereafter. 
Allowing CDM credits to be applied towards compliance in 2005 could also help counteract the 
decreasing interest shown in CDM (and JI) projects in general resulting from the uncertainty of 
the international regime. An EU decision in the near future to allow CDM credits into the EU 
ETS can be expected to kick-start the project mechanisms. 
There is evidence that there are too few JI and CDM projects  – at least at present– to generate 
credits that will be usable before the first commitment period.
11 This is partly due to a lack of 
demand (in the absence of firm rules) and a lack of supply (e.g. long project cycle, high 
transaction costs and a low expected carbon price).
12 While some problems are exogenous and 
cannot be addressed by the EU alone (e.g. long project cycle or high transaction costs), there are 
some issues the EU can address. Kick-starting the project mechanisms is likely to boost 
international efforts – in the absence of certainty on the future of the Kyoto Protocol – to 
advance procedures to approve projects and certify credits. The result is most likely a speeding 
up of the development of the international administrative framework for dealing with the project 
mechanisms as well as a renewed interest in CDM and JI projects.  
 
                                                 
10 Further analysis can be found on the website of the CEPS Task Force on the Business Consequences of 
the Emerging EU ETS (http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=250). 
11 Thus, one could argue that the matter of quantitative restrictions is purely theoretical. Industries are 
arguing for unrestricted use of the flexible mechanisms on the ground that the restrictions are unnecessary 
because they have no effect in reality. Conversely, if this is true then a quantitative restriction can be 
regarded merely as a safeguard against unexpected but very unlikely floods of cheap credits, and is thus 
not objectionable. Nevertheless, projects abating non-CO2 gases have at least in principle the potential to 
generate large volumes of cheap credits; thus, the possibility may not be purely hypothetical.  
12 For evidence on and reasons for the expected shortage of JI and CDM projects, see 
http://www.pointcarbon.com/, http://www.ieta.org/, http://prototypecarbonfund.org/.  
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Ratification and entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol 
It was argued that the linking directive could be a tool to entice further ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Therefore, the EU should not allow CDM (and JI) projects to come into effect any 
earlier than would happen once the Kyoto Protocol comes into force. Thereby, the EU could 
make the point that those countries interested in benefiting from projects need to ratify. Without 
ratification, there will be no CDM or JI investments. There is a second line of reasoning, which 
asserts that the EU should not let there be any doubt as to whether it expects the Kyoto Protocol 
to enter into force. Linking JI and CDM to the EU ETS might be interpreted as harbouring such 
doubts, as it could be construed as a step to establish an entity-based emissions trading scheme, 
which eventually might substitute for the Kyoto Protocol framework. The fear is that Parties 
might eventually benefit from the project mechanisms without ever having ratified or even 
needing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
A firm commitment on the part of the EU to allow CDM credits as of 2005 and JI by 2008 is 
likely to be interpreted under most circumstances as a sign of loyalty to the Kyoto Protocol. A 
precondition, however, is that only projects from those countries that have ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol would be eligible. Such a move could be taken as an assurance that the EU would go 
ahead regardless of other countries’ decisions on ratification. Incidentally, this would be fully 
consistent with the political commitment of the Gothenburg European Council and the 
subsequent EU decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which has made the burden-sharing 
agreement and the Kyoto Protocol binding targets within the EU. If anything, allowing for 
linking CDM and JI to the EU ETS would be a powerful sign that the EU is going ahead. The 
message would be that in the absence of ratification, countries are likely to miss out on 
opportunities available to other parties that have ratified. The long lead times of JI/CDM 
projects combined with the fact that there are economies of scales for projects in the same host 
country,
13 mean that the negative effects may be more than just temporary and will therefore be 
a worry for countries that have not ratified. 
3.2.2  Qualitative and quantitative restrictions 
The proposed qualitative and quantitative restrictions are an attempt to ensure actual and 
permanent reductions and to cope with supplementarity. Qualitative restrictions aim at ensuring 
a certain environmental benefit while quantitative restrictions are a means to operationalise 
supplementarity. Restrictions are accompanied by transparency provisions. Art. 17bis of the 
linking directive calls for an environmental assessment and public consultation on the national 
programmes for the implementation of projects. Art. 30 mandates a review of the impact of 
project mechanisms on host countries with a special reference to “large hydro-electric power 
production projects”.  
Considerations on qualitative restrictions are based on the Marrakech Accord (i.e. nuclear), 
perceived problems with permanence (i.e. sinks) and risks of environmental and social damage 
(i.e. large hydro, if it does not meet criteria set out by the World Commission on Dams). The 
objective of quantitative restrictions is to operationalise the EU’s obligation to use JI and CDM 
in a supplemental way.  
As a result, the EU has been considering the establishment of a hard ceiling or alternatively, a 
reference cap, i.e. a review if the total amount of CERs and ERUs converted for use in the EU 
ETS reaches 6% of the total amount of EU allowances. Such a ceiling could be regarded as a 
                                                 
13 Scale effects are derived from the experience gained from dealing with host country administrations, 
performing identical procedures and more generally, by moving up the learning curves that to some 
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safeguard against possible but highly unlikely floods of cheap credits into the EU, notably from 
projects abating non-CO2 gases. On the other hand, a hard ceiling may create rigidity in an 
emerging (carbon) market. A reference cap will reduce this risk but creates uncertainty in the 
market.  
The economic effects of quantitative restrictions have been documented by the European 
Commission (2003b) at least to some extent
14 and are summarised in Table 1. Nevertheless, 
there has been less discussion on the environmental impact of both quantitative and qualitative 
restrictions. It should be expected that the environmental effects of restrictions are limited by 
companies’ ability to negotiate between different environmental products, which is a result of 
the co-existence of the EU and the international system. Two examples below illustrate the 
complications.  
Table 1. The effects of different quantitative boundaries (for enlarged EU) 
Costs savings 
Scenario 
description 
Overall use of 
JI/CDM as % of 
total allowances 
(2008-12) 
Total costs 
(in €) 
Absolute  in %  
Allowance 
price/tonne 
 of CO2 
(in €) 
CO2 equiv. 
outsourced 
(through EU 
ETS in Mt) 
Total EU 
emissions 
(reference 
=4,664 Mt)* 
Reference case 
(no linking)  0%  €2.9 billion  0  0 %  €26   
0  0 
 
3% Ceiling  3%  €2.8 billion  €100 million  3.4 %  €20   
45 Mt  + 171 Mt  
 
6% Ceiling   6%  €2.4 billion  €500 million  17.2 %  €14   
91 Mt   +208 Mt  
Unlimited use of 
JI/CDM  7% €2.2  billion  €700  million  24.1%  €13   
111 Mt  + 224 Mt  
EU ETS 
participants + 
other Kyoto 
parties use 
JI/CDM  
8% €2  billion  €900  million  31.1%  €11 
 
 
128 Mt  + 128 Mt 
Only EU ETS 
participants 
use JI/CDM 
credits 
13%  €1.1 billion  €1.8 billion  62.2%  €5 
 
192 Mt  + 192 Mt 
* The difference between the sums in this and the previous column is explained by member state use of JI and CDM. 
Source: European Commission (2003b) and own calculations. 
Example 1. Quantitative restrictions 
If we assume that i) the quantitative constraint of for example 6% or 8% is triggered, ii) this 6% 
constraint is pro-rated per installation allocation and iii) CERs/ERUs are cheaper than EU 
allowances, then this creates a secondary market in ‘conversion rights’. EU allowances are fully 
fungible within the EU. For example, companies from ‘old member states’, where the carbon 
constraint generally is higher, can convert ERUs/CERs into EU allowances through installation 
accounts in new member states. In new member states, surplus EU allowances and conversion 
capacity should be available in sufficient volume. For example, if a power company from an old 
member state that needs to buy EU allowances can find CERs on the open market at lower 
prices than EU allowances, then it would be rational to purchase those CERs and convert them 
into EU allowances to the extent possible. However, if this power company exceeds its 
conversion limit, then it is rational to transfer the CERs to another company (perhaps in an 
accession state), which would still have spare conversion capacity. That power company would 
effectively pay a third party a conversion fee to convert the CERs into EU allowances and 
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transfer them back into the company’s compliance account. If ERUs/CERs are cheaper than EU 
allowances, then this conversion will be maximised until either a) their prices equalise or b) 6% 
of the aggregate of all NAPs have been converted to EU allowances, i.e. the entity ceiling has 
been converted into a de facto EU-wide ceiling. The net effect consists of transaction costs for 
companies in the form of the conversion premium.
15 In reality, the 6% reference cap may 
constitute no more than a safeguard against large volumes of cheap credits, which may or may 
not be a hypothetical scenario.  
On the other hand, the perception of risk and smaller long-term markets for project types 
excluded from the ETS would be likely to discourage development of such projects and lower 
the price of credits generated from them. They may also influence the positions of the EU’s 
main Kyoto Protocol partners, which might not want to be seen as accepting credits of lower 
environmental quality projects.  
Example 2. Qualitative restrictions 
The EU has proposed qualitative restrictions on nuclear facilities – in line with the Marrakech 
Accords – sinks and large hydro. Some Annex B countries will not apply the same constraint. 
Hence, there is scope for non-EU/EEA Annex B companies to swap EU-compliant CERs/ERUs 
for non-compliant CERs/ERUs. EU-compliant CERs/ERUs will trade at a premium until the 
price of EU/EEA non-compliant CER/ERUs equals EU allowances plus the conversion rate. 
There is only a real constraint when no non-EU company has any more EU-compliant 
CERs/ERUs left in the registry. Seen from a global perspective, there will likely be no 
environmental benefits from additional EU restrictions. The difference between a scenario with 
EU restrictions and one without is that in the former case all EU-compatible CERs/ERUs will 
be held in the EU with non-EU companies making a profit (of the conversion premium) to the 
detriment of EU companies. Thus, the EU will pay for environmentally higher ambitions. But as 
long as more EU-compatible CERs/ERUs are available worldwide than are needed in the EU as 
a whole, there will be no net environmental benefit.  
Although the global environmental benefits of the qualitative and quantitative restrictions may 
be somewhat limited through the functioning of the trading market, there are nevertheless a 
number of indirect effects. Qualitative restrictions are a safeguard against a flood of cheap 
credits, although such a flood is unlikely. They may also influence market expectations and 
influence other countries’ behaviour. Quantitative restrictions may help the EU to ensure that 
the ETS becomes a success both in economic and environmental terms by exerting an element 
of control on the quantity and quality of JI and CDM credits, even if this comes at a price. This 
analysis also points out that it appears that quantitative restrictions are best adopted, if at all, at 
EU level rather than at member state or even entity level.  
3.2.3 International  effects 
It should be reiterated that both the linking directive and the EU ETS are a ‘domestic policy and 
measure’ in the Kyoto Protocol context and are therefore part of EU domestic measures. The 
two directives do not affect EU member state rights and obligations to operate in the 
international emissions trading market, including the one for the Kyoto Protocol's project 
mechanism. Neither do they affect other Parties’ rights and obligations. Legally speaking, 
therefore, the proposed linking directive cannot amount to a re-negotiation of the Marrakech 
Accords as has been argued elsewhere. Nevertheless, there are important links to the emerging 
                                                 
15 The size of the conversion premium will depend on how many operators are in the position to offer 
conversion services. The larger that number is, the lower the conversion fee should be, and possibly even 
zero.  10 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA 
 
international climate regime in that agreement with the EU’s main partners within the Kyoto 
Protocol framework that will be crucial for future progress.  
The EU has agreed to follow procedures and decisions established under the Kyoto Protocol and 
the Marrakech Accords.
16 This principle has two advantages. First, it avoids the EU having to 
set up a parallel institutional framework that would in fact replicate the work of the UNFCCC 
institutions. Secondly, it places trust in the Kyoto Protocol procedures, in particular the CDM 
Executive Board and the Article 6 Supervisory Committee. There is a drawback, however: the 
EU has accepted and is bound by international agreements that it does not control, such as 
credits for JI/CDM projects. This dilemma is illustrated by the recent agreement reached on 
sinks in the CDM at COP9
17. Other examples are the procedures for crediting CDM and JI 
projects. Similarly, the EU is bound by the decision of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech 
Accords
18 that ERUs can only be issued for compliance in the period after 2008.  
This does not however affect the prerogative of any Party to set rules under its own jurisdiction 
that are in line with the international agreement. This seems to be the case regarding restrictions 
in the linking directive. The linking directive goes beyond the Marrakech Accord in that it deals 
effectively with entity trading, a subject not covered by this Accord. Therefore, although the EU 
restrictions do affect non-EU Parties, they nevertheless do not appear to violate the Marrakech 
Accord. Nevertheless, the EU should ensure effective consultation with its international 
partners, to position itself for future negotiations. 
3.2.4  Linking with other national emissions trading schemes  
The European Commission, member state representatives and Members of the European 
Parliament have all maintained that linking of different emissions trading schemes would be an 
important element in the future climate regime.
19 We would therefore want to assess the extent 
to which the linking directive would facilitate linking. 
Article 25 of the EU ETS directive explicitly provides for linking with greenhouse gas 
emissions trading schemes of Annex B Parties, if the Party in question has ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol. This does not mean that linking is automatic, however. On the contrary, linking is 
subject to an international agreement between the European Union and a third country. This 
means that such an agreement will follow the rules of other international agreements and 
therefore needs to take into account the political realities within the EU.  
There are two reasonable scenarios under which linking would occur. The first scenario is that 
non-EU countries such as Japan and Canada would consider the EU ETS sufficiently attractive 
to establish a link to it. This would in essence mean a bottom-up creation of a global or at least 
Kyoto Protocol-wide scheme for entity-based greenhouse gas emissions trading. The entity-
based GHG emissions trading scheme would operate alongside the (Party-based) International 
Emissions Trading (IET) based on Annex B Parties (Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol). The 
second scenario is that the Kyoto Protocol would never enter into force and that Annex B 
Parties develop an entity-based trading scheme to implement climate change policy in a cost-
effective way.
20 Similarly, if IET under the Kyoto Protocol materialises only slowly or not at 
                                                 
16 The exception is sinks, where the international framework was not yet clear at the time of the proposal. 
COP9, however, has now reached an agreement on sinks.  
17 For an analysis, see for example the COP9 report by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2003). 
18 Decision 16/CP.7 Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
19 This topic has also been analysed in greater detail in chapter 3 of the previous CEPS Task Force Report 
of October 2002 (see Egenhofer & Legge, 2002). 
20 Both scenarios however assume that quantitative ceilings will be applied to entities. COMPLETION OF THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME | 11 
 
all,
21 there will be pressure on the EU to offer linkage to other trading schemes. In both cases, 
linking would be a substitute – at least to some extent – for a top-down emissions trading 
scheme established by international negotiation. 
One of the preconditions for linking with other emissions trading schemes which the EU ETS 
explicitly offers is an ‘agreed currency’, meaning that the ‘traded units’ are (…..) the same or at 
least convertible.
22 One obvious possibility would be to use the currencies from the Kyoto 
Protocol such as Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), CERs, ERUs. However, by introducing 
qualitative restrictions, EU allowances are no longer identical with the Kyoto Protocol units. In 
case of linking, the issue can be addressed by, for example, negotiations on a joint currency, the 
introduction of conversion factors or by secondary markets in conversion rights, but these are 
likely to result in increased transaction costs.  
3.2.5 Offset  projects 
Some interest has been expressed in the Council discussions on the linking directive in linking 
not only to JI/CDM projects but also to domestic offset projects. Domestic offset projects would 
be activities that lead to reductions outside the covered sectors of the EU ETS or JI/CDM. Such 
projects could include measures in the agricultural, transport and household sectors, which are 
currently not covered by the EU ETS. They are comparable to the idea of a ‘project sector’ in 
the original UK emissions trading scheme, but which finally was not taken further.  
An advantage of EU offset projects is that they would link the non-covered sector to the EU 
ETS and would therefore gradually integrate other sectors into the scheme. In addition, it would 
most likely focus on the most cost-effective reduction potentials, thereby reducing compliance 
costs.  
There are a number of drawbacks, however. The first is that domestic offset projects would 
constitute a new instrument, which would necessitate a separate institutional set-up in the EU. 
Domestic offsets are best compared with ‘unilateral JI’, a mechanism that is not foreseen in the 
Kyoto Protocol. Consequently, the UNFCCC institutional infrastructure cannot be used. Such a 
new mechanism may not even be needed since the opt-in clause of Art. 24 of the EU ETS and 
the review and further development clauses in Art. 30 provide opportunity for enlargement of 
sector coverage. Strictly speaking, a broader sector-coverage can also be achieved within the 
current EU ETS. In certain circumstances, offset projects may entail the risk of double-counting. 
In theory, double-counting can be avoided but this might only be possible at the expense of 
complicated procedures, which are likely to increase the complexity and transaction costs. Thus, 
although offset projects in principle can play a useful role in the EU ETS, they pose difficult 
practical issues that need to be resolved.  
 
 
                                                 
21 If IET does not happen, the EU scheme might become the basis for a global scheme. 
22 Theoretically such linking could occur if the different schemes met basic minimal harmonisation 
requirements. In addition to a standardised currency of exchange, this implies harmonised enforcement 
mechanisms including a common penalty rate and monitoring, reporting and verification rules including a 
standard registry. Ideally as part of enforcement there should be a common treatment of sinks, possibly 
based on best practice. See previous CEPS Task Force Report on greenhouse gas emissions trading 
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4  Final Remarks  
This report has dealt with some of the outstanding issues of the proposed linking directive. It 
has described and analysed the principal viewpoints that the different stakeholders have raised. 
This analysis can be found in the main body of the report. The reader will note that the Task 
Force members have not been able to agree on all issues raised in the report. In these instances, 
the report has attempted to present both sides of the argument in a balanced way to allow the 
reader to make his or her own judgment. In this way, we have attempted to provide a useful 
contribution to an important debate on the future of EU climate change policy.   
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